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Abstract
We analyze a two-period agency problem with limited liability and non-
verifiable information. The principal commits to a dynamic bonus pool com-
prising a fixed total payment that may be distributed over time to the agent
and a third party. We find that the optimal two-period contract features mem-
ory. If the agent succeeds in the first-period, second-period incentives are
weakened whereas higher-powered incentives are provided if he fails. The
two-period bonus pool offers a complementary reason for why third-party
payments are not commonly observed in practice.
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1 Introduction
In providing managerial incentives, firms do not rely exclusively on verifiable and
objective performance information such as production quantities, accounting in-
come, or a firm’s stock price. Boards of directors (or, similarly, senior managers)
often adjust these incentives based on their subjective assessments, e.g., if and
to what extent market conditions influenced (favorably or unfavorably) objective
performance measures. Boards also provide incentives based on their subjective
assessments of a manager’s cooperation, loyalty, or reputation (Murphy and Oyer
2003; Gibbs, Merchant, Van der Stede, and Vargus 2004). However, given the
non-verifiability of subjective assessments, boards have substantial discretion in
determining bonus payments.1 Consequently, ex post, a board may have incen-
tives to misreport its subjective assessment in order to reduce wage payments, thus
limiting the contracting usefulness of subjective signals.
Theoretical studies show that bonus-pool arrangements enable boards to use
non-verifiable information for motivating managers (Baiman and Rajan 1995,
MacLeod 2003). Specifically, a board commits to fund a bonus pool with a
fixed payment and any subsequent discretionary bonus payments will deplete the
bonus pool.2 To provide incentives to a manager and to preclude the board from
1For example, consider compensation funding at UBS: “While profitability is the main factor
in determining the size of our bonus pool, and while we apply funding rates that provide an initial
basis for determining divisional bonus pools, management may still apply its discretion and make
adjustments to further assess the overall quality of earnings by looking at relevant key performance
indicators and other qualitative measures, including risk factors. Furthermore, we recognize the
strategic importance of maintaining a competitive position in the labor market, and may also make
adjustments to variable compensation funding determined by competitive benchmarking. . . . Such
management discretion is an important element of the funding framework, enabling us to achieve
a balanced outcome that considers all the relevant factors.” UBS, Compensation funding and
expenses, 2010 Compensation at a glance.
2MacLeod 2003 and Baiman and Rajan 1995, Rajan and Reichelstein 2006, and Ederhof, Ra-
jan, and Reichelstein 2010, among others, consider a single-period agency where either a single or
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misreporting non-verifiable information, the bonus pool is paid out in full, i.e.,
any funds not paid to the manager are diverted to a third party such as a char-
ity (MacLeod 2003).3 Anecdotal evidence provides examples of third-party pay-
ments from bonus pools.4 However, despite the anecdotal evidence, these pay-
ments do not seem to be very common.5 One argument for why third-party pay-
ments do not have much institutional support is that, often, multiple managers are
eligible for receiving payments from a bonus pool (Rajan and Reichelstein 2006;
Ederhof, Rajan, and Reichelstein 2010). In this study, we present another argu-
ment for why third-party payments may not be very common. Dynamic bonus-
pool arrangements where a board commits to an overall fixed payment covering
multiple periods and where any non-paid amount is rolled-over to the next period
limit the frequency of third-party payments. Such dynamic bonus-pool arrange-
ments apply, e.g., in settings where bonus pools cover a full year and boards or
senior managers conduct mid-year evaluations.6
multiple agents are eligible for receiving payments from a bonus pool. In contrast, we consider a
two-period agency where a single agent is eligible for receiving payments from a dynamic bonus
pool; the bonus pool is dynamic in the sense that any funds not distributed to the agent at the end
of the first period are rolled over to the second period.
3Alternatively, repeated interactions between boards and managers introduce reputational con-
siderations that enforce relational contracts using non-verifiable information for implicit incentives
(Bull 1987; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1994). Baldenius and Glover (2011) compare bonus
pools and reputation as two mechanisms for overcoming the principal’s credibility problem.
4For example, at Credit Suisse in 2009, “in view of the challenging economic environment,”
a portion of the executive board’s variable compensation pool was approved to fund charitable
contributions. The payment of CHF 20 million to charities relates to the compensation of CHF
19.20 million for the highest paid member of the executive board.
5Following Rajan and Reichelstein (2009), a principal can also divert money to third parties
if she includes an additional individual in the bonus-pool arrangement who does not require in-
centives and whose compensation is already sufficient without any payouts from the bonus pool.
Frequently, boards have the discretion to decide whether newly hired employees are entitled to
participate in the allocation of an already established (dynamic) bonus pool arrangement. Accord-
ingly, making a new employee eligible for an existing bonus-pool arrangement is tantamount to
diverting funds from the bonus pool to a third party.
6Focusing on the wealth transfer and neglecting any incentive implications, dynamic bonus
pools also apply in settings where a firm’s bonus plan limits the stock options that the firm’s board
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Specifically, this study addresses (i), the efficiency of dynamic bonus-pool
arrangements relative to single-period bonus-pool arrangements and (ii), how a
dynamic bonus-pool arrangement affects the use of non-verifiable information for
incentive provision. We extend the analysis of short-term bonus-pool arrange-
ments with a single agent (MacLeod 2003) to a two-period setting. Similar to
Baldenius and Glover (2011), the agent is protected by limited liability.7 The
principal commits to fund a two-period bonus pool with a fixed payment. In each
period, incentives are only provided based on subjective performance measures.
The fraction of the overall bonus pool not distributed to the agent at the end of the
first period is rolled over to the second period; in the second period, the princi-
pal retains discretion as to either pay out the remaining money to the agent or to
(partly) divert it to a third party.
A first question refers to the efficiency of dynamic bonus-pool arrangements
relative to single-period bonus-pool arrangements. Similar to studies of single-
period bonus pools (Baiman and Rajan 1995; MacLeod 2003; Rajan and Re-
ichelstein 2006, 2009; Ederhof 2010), when committing to a fixed payment in
a two-period setting, a principal has no incentives to misreport non-verifiable in-
formation, thus enabling the use of non-verifiable information for allocating bonus
payments.8 We demonstrate that a dynamic bonus-pool arrangement for two peri-
ods outperforms two consecutive single-period bonus pool arrangements in terms
of the principal’s total wage payment for the two periods. With a dynamic bonus-
can grant, over a specified time period, to executives.
7With a bonus pool, it seems even less reasonable that the agent makes payments to the princi-
pal.
8Implicitly, our study assumes that deferring a compensation payment to the second period
does not yield a profit from interest to the principal. For example, when any benefits from interest
payments are included in the bonus pool or given a negligible interest rate, there is no profit from
interest to the principal when she defers compensation payments to a future period.
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pool arrangement, the principal benefits from two effects: First, with a two-period
bonus pool, the principal can reduce the rent the agent earns from limited liability.
Second, and more importantly, third-party payments can be reduced by pooling
them in the second period.9 While the latter result is similar to the efficiency
gains from combining multiple agents in one bonus-pool arrangement (Baiman
and Rajan 1995; Rajan and Reichelstein 2006, 2009; Ederhof 2010), it deviates
in that it is not a different agent but rather the same agent in a future period who
(partly) budget-balances with the (first-period) agent.
The second question relates to the structure of the optimal incentive con-
tract under a dynamic bonus-pool arrangement. We find that the optimal two-
period contract features memory. Specifically, if the agent obtains a positive first-
period subjective assessment, the principal chooses weak second-period incen-
tives, whereas the principal chooses strong second-period incentives for a neg-
ative first-period subjective assessment. In the second period, given a positive
first-period subjective assessment and similar to MacLeod (2003), the optimal
bonus-pool arrangement pays the (remaining) bonus pool amount to the agent
unless the worst possible subjective assessment materializes. Thus, the second
period entails wage compression in the sense that any signal except for the worst
is pooled into the same outcome to the agent. In contrast, if the agent obtains a
negative first-period subjective assessment, the principal provides strong second-
period incentives. Intuitively, with a negative first-period subjective assessment,
no payout to the agent was made in the first period, such that the budget constraint
9Notably, our result differs from Ederhof, Rajan, and Reichelstein (2010), Proposition 4.1.
Different to our study, they assume that the limited liability constraints are not binding and find
that the optimal two-period bonus-pool arrangement with a roll-over provision is equivalent to
repeating the optimal single-period bonus-pool arrangement.
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is not binding in the second period. However, we find that the high payout only
occurs for the highest subjective assessment. Consequently, the second period
again entails wage compression, but now in the sense that any signal except for
the best is pooled into the same outcome (i.e., a zero payment) to the agent.
Overall, similar to MacLeod (2003), the optimal dynamic bonus-pool arrange-
ment is generally not proper in the sense that the entire bonus amount is always
paid out to the participating agent. While payments to third parties are relatively
unlikely if the agent obtained a positive first-period subjective assessment (i.e.,
only for the worst possible signal in the second period), payments to third parties
are highly likely if the agent obtained a negative first-period subjective assessment
(i.e., always except for the best possible signal in the second period).
Dynamic incentive problems raise also the question of how vulnerable dy-
namic bonus-pool arrangements are to renegotiations between contracting parties.
We find that the optimal dynamic bonus pool is renegotiation-proof if the third
party is also a signatory of the initial contract. For example, a publicly known
policy that new employees are eligible to participate in a bonus-pool arrangement
may serve as a commitment device that renders dynamic bonus-pool arrangements
negotiation proof.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
model. Section 3 contains the analysis. After considering short-term contracts,
we illustrate the benefits of long-term contracts with memory and derive the char-
acteristics of optimal long-term contracts. Renegotiation is considered in Section
4. Section 5 addresses the setting with a risk-averse agent. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Model
We consider a principal/agent-relation over two periods t = 1, 2. In each pe-
riod, the manager (agent) provides a productive effort, at ∈ {aH , aL}. The firm
(principal) wants to implement action aH in each period. To that purpose, in each
period, the principal privately observes a subjective performance metric, Yt, which
can take values in Y = {y1, . . . , yn}.
In each period t, the probabilities pkit = Prob
{
Yt = yi | ak
}
, k = H,L, satisfy
the strict monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP) p
L
it
pHit
>
pLi+1,t
pHi+1,t
, i = 1, ..., n−1,
i.e., higher indices indicate better news which respect to the agent having provided
the desired action aH . To simplify the statement of the results, we assume that for
all realizations it holds that pHit 6= pLit, i.e., each observation is either good news or
bad news with respect to the agent’s action (for a similar assumption, see MacLeod
2003). Subsequently, most contracts will take the form of binary bonus schemes;
hence, it is convenient to denote by P kit =
∑n
j=i p
k
jt the probability that a certain
performance target yi is met in period t under action k.
The principal is risk-neutral and seeks to minimize his cost of implementing
at = a
H in each period. The agent is risk-neutral. His utility is u1(s1, s2, a1, a2) =∑2
t=1 st − ct(at) at the beginning of the first period and u2(s2, a2) = s2 − c2(a2)
at the beginning of the second, where st is his compensation and ct(at) is his cost
of effort in period t. To simplify notation, let ckt = ct(a
k) denote the cost of
effort, ak, k = H,L; for simplicity, we normalize the cost of low effort to zero,
cLt = 0. The agent’s outside options yield expected utilities of U
R
1 = u
R
1 + u
R
2
at the beginning of the first period and UR2 = u
R
2 at the beginning of the second
period.
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We consider two different contracts that may be offered to the agent. Short-
term contracts specify sit = st(yi) as the payments in t if Yt = yi is realized.
Long-term contracts may exhibit memory in the sense that second-period pay-
ments sij2 = s2(yi, yj) may depend on both Y1 and Y2. In both cases, the principal
has to account for the fact that Yt is subjective information which he privately
observes: both the short-term and the long-tern contract cannot be enforced at
a court. We therefore focus on bonus-pool contracts as analyzed by Rajan and
Reichelstein (2009), where the principal commits to a constant total payment s
which he may distribute among the agent and a third party, such as a charity. The
total payment is observable and thus enforceable and, ex post, the principal has
no incentive to misreport the agent’s performance. Given a short-term contract, a
bonus pool st is set up for each period, whereas with a long-term contract a bonus
pool s is specified for both periods.
Due to the non-verifiable performance measure, an incentive problem arises
even under the assumption of a risk-neutral agent. We assume that the firm cannot
be sold to the manager because the latter is of restricted wealth. More formally, we
assume that payments have to exceed a minimum level smin in each period. Lim-
ited liability implies an incentive problem even with a risk-neutral agent, which
has already been analyzed in models with verifiable information (e.g. Innes 1990,
Kim 1995 and Demougin and Fluet 1998). In this sense, we combine in our
model the contracting frictions arising from limited liability and unverifiable in-
formation.
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3 Analysis
3.1 Short-term contracts
If short-term contracts are applied, the principal’s problem to minimize his pay-
ment st in period t is similar to that analyzed by MacLeod (2003), except that
we take into account the agent’s liability level smin. For period t = 1, 2, the cost
minimization program takes the form
min
s1,...sn
st (1)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
pHit sit − cHt ≥ uRt (2)
n∑
i=1
pHit sit − cHt ≥
n∑
i=1
pLit sit (3)
sit ≤ st (4)
sit ≥ smin. (5)
The principal’s objective is to minimize his fixed payment st. The individual
rationality constraint, (2), ensures that the agent will sign the contract and the
incentive compatibility constraint, (3), guarantees that the agent will choose aH .
Constraint (4) is the bonus-pool constraint, stating that the payments to the agent
must not exceed the size of the bonus pool. The liability constraints, (5), require
all payments to be at least equal to smin.
If the liability constraints, (5), do not bind, the optimal contract takes the form
derived in MacLeod (2003): it is a binary contract in which a bonus is paid for
all but the poorest performance. Only if y1 is realized, the amount is paid to the
third party. This contract is designed such that payments to the third party are
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minimized because third-party payments are lost for the provision of expected
utility to the agent. With the agent earning a rent, however, this is no longer
important, i.e., only the absolute bonus amount matters, but not its expectation.
The optimal contract under limited liability therefore significantly differs from
the optimal contract derived by MacLeod (2003).10
Proposition 1 If in the optimal short-term contract the agent earns a rent, this
contract is binary and takes the form
s∗it =

smin if pHit < p
L
it
smin +
cHt
PHt+−PLt+
else.
(6)
where P kt+ =
∑
{i|pHit>pLit} p
k
it is the probability of outcomes which are more likely
under aH .
Proposition 1 shows that the absolute bonus which is necessary to induce the
high effort level is minimized by refusing its payment in all cases which are more
likely under aL than under aH , thus bringing bad news with respect to the agent’s
action. For illustration, rearrangement of the incentive compatibility constraint,
(3), yields
n∑
i=1
[
pHit − pLit
]
sit ≥ cHt .
If pHit < p
L
it, the term in brackets is negative, and the incentive problem is aggra-
vated by any positive payment sit. Therefore, the principal does best by paying
the minimum wage smin in all of these instances.11
10All proofs are included in the Appendix. An asterisk indicates an optimal short-term contract.
11If both the liability constraint and the individual rationality constraint are binding, the contract
becomes more complicated and is three-step. It differs from the binary contract of proposition 1 in
9
The distinction between good news and bad news will play a central role in
the subsequent analysis of the long-term contract. Therefore, it will be convenient
to denote I−t = {i | pHit < pLit} as the set of realizations which convey bad news in
period t, and I+t = {i | pHit ≥ pLit} as the set of realizations with good news. We
also state that for I−t the agent has “failed” in the first period, whereas for I
+
t the
agent has “succeeded” in the first period.
If there is only one realization for which pHit < p
L
it, the structure of the contract
under unlimited liability and limited liability obviously are the same. Contrary, if
I+t contains only one element, the optimal bonus contract under limited liability
yields payments identical to those in an contract with verifiable information and
limited liability, where a bonus is paid only for the best performance, yn (see
Demougin and Fluet 1998).
Proposition 1 characterizes optimal short-term contracts that differ from “ex-
treme” contracts where, in case of unlimited liability and non-verifiable informa-
tion, the bonus is either almost always paid (i.e., for all but the worst performance)
or, in case of limited liability and verifiable information, almost never paid (i.e.
only for the best performance). Since we are interested in the effects of limited
liability and non-verifiable information, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 In each period, both sets I−t and I+t have at least two elements.
The following example illustrates the difference between the three settings
with unlimited liability and non-verifiable information, with limited liability and
non-verifiable information, and with limited liability and verifiable information:
that a bonus (of smaller amount) is paid also for the highest realization of Yt conveying bad news.
In a companion paper, Budde (2011) provides a complete characterization.
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Example 1 Let the probabilities in period t = 1, 2 be given by
pkit y1 y2 y3 y4
aL 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
aH 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Thus, y1 and y2 convey bad news about the agent’s action, whereas y3 and y4
are good news. The agent’s cost of high effort is cHt = 1, the minimum wage is
smin = 0, and the agent’s reservation level of utility uRt may take values 0 or 2.
Case 1: Non-verifiable information. With uRt = 2, the liability constraint (3)
is not binding, and the optimal bonus pool contract is
s∗it =

0 for i = 1
10
3
for i = 2, 3, 4
and has the structure as in McLeod (2003).
Case 2: Non-verifiable information and limited liability. With uRt = 0, the
liability constraint, (3), is binding, and the optimal bonus-pool contract is
s∗it =

0 for i = 1, 2
5
2
for i = 3, 4.
Case 3: Verifiable information. In contrast, a contract
s∗it =

0 for i = 1, 2, 3
10
3
for i = 4
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of the form derived by Demougin and Fluet (1998) would be offered if Yt were
contractible information.
In Case 1, the agent exactly achieves his reservation level uRt of expected util-
ity. In Case 2, the agent earns a rent from limited liability. The required bonus for
good performance is lower in Case 2 of limited liability relative to Case 1 without
limited liability (5/2-0=2.5 instead of 10/3-0=3.33). But if a contract with that
bonus agreement (bonus 2.5 if i=3,4) were offered in Case 1 with non-binding
liability constraint, the principal would have to increase the base salary for y1 and
y2 from 0 to 1.25 to make the agent sign the contract, increasing total compen-
sation cost to 1.25+2.5=3.75. Therefore, the principal benefits from paying the
higher bonus 3.33 with a higher probability (.9 instead of .7) to keep third-party
payments to a minimum and provide the agent with the highest possible expected
utility that is possible without completely destroying incentives.
Comparing the bonuses in Cases 2 and 3, we observe that the bonus is also
higher in a situation with verifiable performance information.12 But since this
bonus is only paid with probability .4, whereas the payment 2.5 in Case 2 is due
in any instance (either to the agent or a third party), the principal’s compensa-
tion costs are lower with verifiable information relative to the setting with non-
verifiable information (.4 · 3.33 = 1.33 instead of 2.5).
3.2 Long-term contracts with memory
In the long-term contract, the principal may offer different contracts in the second
period, depending on the realization of the agent’s first-period performance. The
12In fact, the bonus is identical to that in the first contract. But this identity is owed to the
symmetry of the example, where pL1t − pH1t = pH4t − pL4t.
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principal’s cost-minimization problem then takes the form
min
{si1},{sij2}
s (7)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
si1p
H
i1 − cH1 +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
sij2p
H
i1p
H
j2 − cH2 ≥ UR1 (8)
n∑
j=1
sij2p
H
j2 − cH2 ≥ UR2 ∀ i (9)
n∑
i=1
si1p
H
i1 − cH1 +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
sij2p
H
i1p
H
j2 − cH2
≥
n∑
i=1
si1p
L
i1 +
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
sij2p
L
i1p
H
j2 − cH2 (10)
n∑
j=1
sij2p
H
j2 − cH2 ≥
n∑
j=1
sij2p
L
j2 ∀ i (11)
si1 + sij2 ≤ s ∀ i, j (12)
si1 ≥ smin, sij2 ≥ smin ∀ i, j (13)
The principal wants to minimize the total payment s of both periods. Inequal-
ities (8) and (9) state the agent’s individual rationality constraints at the beginning
of the first and second period. Constraint (9) is a set of second-period individ-
ual rationality constraints which are contingent on the agent’s first-period perfor-
mance. This contingency is due to the fact that the principal may offer different
contracts for different first-period performances. For all of these contracts, the
agent’s expected utility has to be at least equal to his second-period outside option
UR2 .
Contingencies are also present in the incentive compatibility constraints, (10)
and (11). The second-period constraints (11) depend the agent’s first-period per-
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formance. For all outcomes, the agent has to prefer aH to aL. For the first period,
the incentive compatibility constraint, (10), is more subtle because it entails the
second-period consequences of the agent’s first-period action. To let the agent
prefer a1 = aH over a1 = aL, his direct benefits from expected first-period per-
formance plus the indirect benefits from potentially more attractive second-period
contracts have to exceed the cost cH1 of high effort in the first period. Since (11)
guarantees that the agent will choose aH in the second period, he will anticipate
a2 = a
H when calculating these second-period benefits.
Wages si1 and sij2 are related to the principal’s objective function by the bonus
pool constraints, (12), stating that the total payment of both periods must not
exceed the bonus pool size s for any realization of (Y1, Y2). Finally, the liability
constraints, (13), ensure that no payment falls short of the minimum wage smin.
In a first step, we show that postponement of payments can be used to im-
prove short-term contracts. In the subsequent section, we characterize the optimal
contract.
Proposition 2 If in the optimal short-term contract the agent earns a rent, then in
the optimal long-term contract second-period payments will nontrivially depend
on first-period outcomes, i.e., the optimal long-term contract has memory.
In a long-term contract, the principal can reduce compensation cost by provid-
ing first-period incentives via the prospect of a more attractive second-period con-
tract under first-period success. To that purpose, he may extend the set of realiza-
tions where the agent is entitled to receive a bonus payment in the second period,
provided he succeeded in the first period. This helps to cut third-party payments
and increases the agent’s second-period utility. Since the modified contract is only
14
offered under I+1 , the utility increase works as an additional first-period incentive,
and the first-period bonus can be reduced. Obviously, this reduction comes at a
cost because as we have already seen in subsection 3.1, the second-period bonus
has to be increased under lower-powered incentives in order to implement the de-
sired effort level. Proposition 2 essentially shows that the second-period costs of
an increased agent rent are outweighed by the first-period savings from a smaller
bonus, implying that a long-term contract with memory is beneficial to the princi-
pal.
The procedure is illustrated in the following extension of the example:
Example 1 (cont.) Suppose the data of the example above applies in both peri-
ods. The optimal short-term contract
s∗it =

0 if i = 1, 2
5
2
else
yields a total compensation cost of 2 · 5
2
= 5. This contract can be improved in the
above described manner: In the second period, the agent receives
sij2 =

0 if j = 1, 2
5
2
else
in case that Y1 ∈ {y1, y2} and
sij2 =

0 if j = 1
10
3
else
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if Y1 ∈ {y3, y4} is realized in the first period. Thus, under I+1 , he receives a
bonus of 10
3
with probability 0.9, whereas under I−1 , he receives a bonus of
5
2
with
probability 0.7. The difference in expected utility is ∆2 = 910 · 103 − 710 · 52 = 3− 74 =
5
4
. Thus, the bonus for the first period can be reduced by 5
4
, which yields
si1 =

0 if i = 1, 2
5
2
− 5
4
= 5
4
else.
Total compensation cost is s = 5
4
+ 10
3
= 55
12
< 5.
Note that the improvement suggested by Proposition 2 is only possible if both
limited liability and unverifiable information are present. When there is no lim-
ited liability, given a non-verifiable signal, only for the worst performance y1 no
bonus is paid in the short-term contract (MacLeod 2003). Therefore, extending
the scope of bonus payments, i.e., the set of outcomes for which a bonus is paid,
yields identical payments to the agent for all performance levels, thereby destroy-
ing incentives. In turn, when there is limited liability and a verifiable signal, an
extension of the scope of bonus payments could well be applied. However, such
an extension does not reduce the expected compensation cost because the im-
plied second-period costs of an increased agent rent exactly offset the first-period
savings from a smaller bonus. While the maximum payment is key with a non-
verifiable signal, the expected payment matters with a verifiable signal. 13
13With verifiable information, memory in long-term contracts has also been found for other
reasons. For example, memory in long-term contracts enables consumption smoothing by the
agent (Rogerson 1985) or lets the principal induce varying agent’s effort over time (Schmitz 2005).
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3.3 Optimal long-term contract
The last subsection proved that improvements are possible by introducing mem-
ory in the contract. This was done by changing the second-period contract for
good news in the first period, i.e., the principal provides first-period incentives by
offering a different second-period contract. This effect can be supplemented by
changing the contract for bad news in the first period, too. Obviously, this has to
be done in the opposite direction, i.e., by restricting the realization of Y2 for which
a bonus is paid. To maintain second-period incentives, the bonus in the second pe-
riod has to be increased. With respect to total compensation cost, such an increase
for small variations has no effect because we consider those realizations of first-
period performance in which no bonus was paid. The bonus pool therefore has
some leeway to extend the second-period bonus.
To what extent these two instruments are used in the optimal contract depends
on the parameters of the problem. In our example, it looks like follows:
Example 1 (cont.) Suppose again that the initial data hold for both periods. The
optimal long-term contract takes the form
s†i1 =

0 if i = 1, 2
5
6
if i = 3, 4
in the first period, and in the second period the agent receives
s†ij2 =

0 if j = 1, 2, 3
10
3
else
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in case that Y1 ∈ {y1, y2} and
s†ij2 =

0 if j = 1
10
3
else
if Y1 ∈ {y3, y4}.14 The principal’s compensation cost is s = 56 + 103 = 256 .
Two issues are noteworthy. The first issue relates to the origin of the prin-
cipal’s benefits from the two-period contract, as compared to a repeated short-
term contract in each period. These benefits not only arise from a reduction of
agent’s rent from limited liability, but also from a reduction of the third-party
payment. In the example, with two consecutive short-term contracts, the agent’s
ex-ante expected utility is 2 · [ 7
10
· 5
2
− 1] = 3
2
, whereas the third party receives
2 · 3
10
5
2
= 3
2
in expectation. Under the two-period contract, the agent’s expected
utility is 3
10
[
0 + 2
5
10
3
]
+ 7
10
[
5
6
+ 9
10
10
3
] − 2 = 13
12
while the expected third-party
payment is 3
10
[
5
6
+ 3
5
10
3
]
+ 7
10
[
1
10
10
3
]− 2 = 13
12
. Thus, the principal’s cost savings
of 5 − 25
6
= 5
6
consists of a rent reduction and a reduced third-party payment of
3
2
− 13
12
each.15
The second issue relates to the structure of the contract. In the second period,
it has an extreme form. If the agent has “failed” in the first period (i.e., for I−1 ), no
bonus was due and the budget constraint of the bonus pool is no longer binding.
The offered contract therefore has the form as with verifiable information, offering
a high bonus, but only for the best performance. If the agent “succeeded” in
the first period (i.e., for I+1 ), the logic is reversed: now the budget constraint is
14A dagger indicates an optimal long-term contract.
15The identity of the two amounts is due to the symmetry of the example. Differing amounts
may occur, but the benefits in general will arise from both origins.
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binding, but the economics of limited liability are mitigated by the fact that first-
period incentives are provided by second-period bonuses. The contract therefore
has the structure as under unlimited liability and unverifiable information, paying
a bonus for all but the worst performance.
This extreme structure will only be observed in special cases, where the rents
produced by limited liability are high enough in both periods. In general, the
contract may be modified in different extent. The general structure, however, will
remain. In the following proposition, we describe its most important features.
Proposition 3 If in the optimal long-term contract the agent earns a rent, this
contract has the following properties:
1. The first-period compensation has the form
s†i1 =

smin if i ∈ I−1
si ≥ smin if i ∈ I+1
(14)
2. If si > smin for some i ∈ I+1 in the first period, the second-period compen-
sation for i has the form:
s†ij2 =

si12 ≥ smin if j = 1
si12 +
cH2
pL12−pH12
else
(15)
Proposition 3 states that in the first period the mere structure of the limited
liability contract will remain: Only the minimum payments will be made if the
agent’s performance conveys bad news. With good news, however, the bonus
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can be postponed (partly or completely) to the second period. More importantly,
Proposition 3 states that if first-period incentives cannot completely be provided
by second-period payments, the second period incentive contract will take the
form proposed by MacLeod (2003) and Rajan and Reichelstein (2009) for the case
without binding liability constraints, i.e., a bonus is refused only for the worst
performance. Following the argument in Section 3.1, in the second period, the
agent thus obtains the maximum expected utility for given incentives. Therefore,
the described contract fully uses the cost-reducing modifications characterized in
Proposition 2, providing first-period incentives by a more attractive second-period
contract under good news.16
At the same time, the extension of the scope of bonus payments in period
two leads to a reduced probability of third-party payments. To see this, consider
the example: in both the long-term contract and the repeated short-term contract,
third-party payments are avoided if the agent is rewarded in both periods. In the
repeated short-term contract the probability of no third-party payments is 7/10 ·
7/10 = 0.49. In the long-term contract the probability of no third-party payments
increases to 7/10 · 9/10 = 0.63. Indeed, this property at least weakly holds in
general:
Corollary 1 If the agent earns a rent from limited liability in the optimal long-
term contract, the probability of third-party payments is (weakly) reduced, com-
pared to the optimal short-term contract. Under the conditions of Proposition 3
2, the reduction is strict.
16With the contract characterized in Proposition 3, the principal implements aH in both periods.
Moreover, given that the bonus pool is fixed, the principal has no strict incentives to strategically
deviate from truthfully reporting the observed performance.
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Given the nature of the optimal long-term contract described in Proposition 3,
the intuition of Corollary 1 is straightforward: since the mere structure of first-
period payments is identical under both the optimal long-term contract and the
repeated optimal short-term contract, the question of whether the probability of
third-party payments is reduced in the optimal long-term contract solely depends
on the bonus probability in the second period under first-period good news. As
the proof of Proposition 2 shows, this probability is at least weakly larger in the
long-term contract because an extended scope of second-period bonus payments
reduces the total bonus.
It is instructive to ask how our results relate to Ederhof et al. (2010), Proposi-
tion 4.1. Specifically, the fact that the principal’s benefit from a dynamic contract
arises not only from a reduction of the agent’s rent provokes the question of why
similar savings are not possible if the agent does not earn a rent from limited li-
ability. In a model with a binary performance measure and a risk-averse agent
with unlimited wealth, Ederhof et al. (2010), Proposition 4.1, show that the op-
timal two-period contract is equivalent to a repetition of the optimal one-period
contract. The difference between their result and ours can be explained by the
liability restriction imposed in our model: if the agent does not earn a rent from
limited liability in the one-period contract, none of the two contract modifications
described above is feasible and beneficial. Under I−1 , the contract modification is
not possible because it results in a reduction of the agent’s second-period utility,
which is impossible if he does not earn a rent. In turn, under I+1 , the proposed
modification requires an extension of the bonus payment to outcomes with poorer
performance. But since in the optimal short-term contract without limited liabil-
ity the bonus is refused only for the poorest performance, such an extension is not
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beneficial to the principal.17
4 Renegotiation
Considering renegotiation forces us to think in more detail about the nature of the
contract including payments to a third party. The most important question in this
respect is whether the third party is a signatory of this contract or benefits from
the contract in a passive way - as a third party in a narrower sense.
Following the principle of “those who make a contract, may unmake it” (Beatty
v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919)) also in its neg-
ative sense, renegotiation is not possible without the third party if it has signed
the initial contract, even if it has no duties from this contract. In this case, any
second-period contract which implements the desired action aH is efficient if the
third party is risk neutral. Under risk neutrality, for a given action, the distribu-
tion of money is a zero-sum game. Any change of the contract may only yield
an inefficient action aL, reducing the pie to be shared, or lead to a distribution of
outcome that makes at least one party worse off. The parties therefore never will
agree upon a change, and the contract presented in Section 3.3 is renegotiation
proof.
If the third party is not a signee, the contract presented in the preceding sec-
tion is not renegotiation proof. After the first period has elapsed, the principal
and the agent will have an incentive to change the contract to that incentive com-
patible one which minimizes the payment to the third party because this way the
17Additionally, Ederhof et al. (2010) consider a setting with a binary performance measure,
rendering the contract modifications suggested in Proposition 3 impossible. However, their result
would also hold in a framework with more outcomes as long as the agent’s participation constraint
is binding. A more detailed comparison is provided in Section 5.
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pie to be shared among the two is maximized. Since this contract is the same for
all realizations of Y1, the provision of first-period incentives by offering different
second-period contracts under good news and bad news would be completely re-
moved by such renegotiation: in order to maximize his part of the surplus, the
principal will have an incentive to always report bad news in the first period and
not to pay the promised bonus, even if he has observed good news.
5 Risk-averse agent
The contrast between Proposition 2 and the result of Ederhof et al. (2010) raises
the question of what mainly drives our result. As we have already argued in Sec-
tion 3.3, limited liability is crucial because the resulting rents the agent earns in
a one-period contract give the opportunity to offer second-period contracts of dif-
ferent expected utility to the agent, thereby providing first-period incentives. We
now analyze whether this kind of contract modification is also beneficial if the
agent is risk-averse.
With a risk-averse agent, two aspects could hinder such benefits. First, the con-
tract modification characterized in Proposition 2 exchanges part of the first-period
bonus against an increased second-period bonus. Since the second-period bonus
is only due if the agent succeeds, this introduces additional uncertainty into the
contract. With a risk-averse agent, a higher risk premium will result. ¿From the
outset it is not clear whether the benefits from the contract modification outweigh
these costs. Second, risk aversion may also give rise to the issue of consumption
smoothing over periods. As can be seen from the example, compensation varies
substantially in the modified contract, even if the agent succeeds in both periods.
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Subsequently, we will show that none of these aspects affects the validity of
our main result. To that purpose, we consider the extreme situation where the
agent’s utility is completely independent over periods, without an opportunity to
smooth consumption via the capital market. Intuitively, this assumption should
favor contracts which are similar over time. Formally, the agent’s utility is given
by u1(s1, s2, a1, a1) =
∑2
t=1 v(st)− ct(at) at the beginning of the first period and
u2(s2, a2) = v(s2) − c2(a2) at the beginning of the second, where v(·) denotes
the agent’s utility from wealth and v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0 imply the agent’s strict risk
aversion. All other model assumption remain valid.
In a first step, we analyze the optimal one-period contract. The principal’s
optimization problem becomes
min
s1,...sn
st (16)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
pHit v(sit)− cHt ≥ uRt (17)
n∑
i=1
pHit v(sit)− cHt ≥
n∑
i=1
pLit v(sit) (18)
sit ≤ st (19)
si ≥ smin. (20)
If the liability constraint, (20), is not binding, the contract has the structure
proposed by MacLeod (2003), as it was already described in Section 3.1. If the
agent earns a rent from limited liability, the optimal short-term contract has the
same structure as under risk neutrality, stipulating a bonus for good news:
Proposition 4 Consider a risk-averse agent; if in the optimal short-term contract
the agent earns a rent, this contract is binary and takes the form
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s∗it =

smin if pHit < p
L
it
v−1
(
v(smin) +
cHt
PHt+−PLt+
)
else,
(21)
where P kt+ =
∑
{i|pHit>pLit} p
k
it.
Risk sharing issues are of no relevance in the optimal contract because, fol-
lowing limited liability, the agent’s expected utility exceeds his reservation utility.
Therefore, the same structure of the optimal contract as under risk neutrality re-
sults.
This structure, in turn, affords the same contract modifications as proposed in
Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 for a risk-neutral agent. As a consequence, the optimal
two-period contract has memory also for a risk-averse agent.
Proposition 5 Consider a risk-averse agent; if in the optimal short-term con-
tract the agent earns a rent, then in the optimal long-term contract second-period
payments will nontrivially depend on first-period outcomes, i.e., the optimal long-
term contract has memory.
The proof to Proposition 5 demonstrates that at least under first-period bad
news a modification of the second-period compensation is also beneficial with a
risk-averse agent. It therefore ties in with our description in Section 3.2 of how
short-term contracts can be improved. Since in the case of bad news no bonus is
paid in the first period, there is some leeway for higher-powered incentives in the
second period, leading to a lower expected utility from second-period compensa-
tion for the agent. Since no such utility loss is realized under first-period good
news, the agent experiences an additional punishment for failure that –due to his
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limited liability– cannot be given by direct first-period wage cuts. Dynamic bonus
pools agreements therefore in some sense help to break the liability constraint of
the first period. This can be used to reduce the first-period bonus, thereby decreas-
ing the size of the overall bonus pool.
It is less obvious that the contract modification under first period good news
is also beneficial if the agent is risk averse because it exchanges (part of) the first-
period bonus against an increase of the uncertain second-period bonus. But since
the agent is risk neutral at the margin, at least a small modification of this kind
will also be made. This can be seen from a modification of the example:
Example 1 (cont.) Suppose that all data of the example holds except that the
agent’s utility is u1(s1, s2, a1, a1) =
∑2
t=1
√
st − ct(at) at the beginning of the
first period and u2(s2, a2) =
√
s2 − c2(a2) at the beginning of the second. The
optimal short-term contract is
s∗it =

0 if i = 1, 2
6.25 if i = 3, 4
Total compensation cost is 2 · 6.25 = 12.5. The optimal long-term contract takes
the form
s†i1 =

0 if i = 1, 2
3.27 if i = 3, 4
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in the first period, and in the second period the agent receives
s†ij2 =

0 if j = 1, 2
0.05 if j = 3
10.61 else
in case that Y1 ∈ {y1, y2} and
s†ij2 =

0 if j = 1
0.7 if j = 2
7.34 else
in case that Y1 ∈ {y3, y4}. Total compensation cost is 3.27 + 7.34 = 10.61.
The example illustrates that the contract modification under bad news is used al-
most to the full extend (only a small payment of 0.05 for Y2 = y3 is left), but
that the contract modification under good news is used to an only small extend (a
bonus of just 0.7 for Y2 = y2 compared to 7.34 for Y2 ∈ {y3, y4}). The exam-
ple therefore shows that due to their riskiness, lagged rewards become much less
important under risk aversion, whereas lagged punishments remain.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis shows that bonus pools significantly change if they are applied in
a multi-period agency setting. By postponing first-period bonus payments to the
second period, the principal may not only reduce the agent’s rent from limited
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liability, he may also save payments which would otherwise be transferred to
a third party. First-period incentives are provided by offering different second-
period contracts under good news and bad news in the first period: If first-period
performance provides good news, the second-period contract gives low-powered
incentives, offering a high expected utility to the agent. Under bad news for the
agent’s first-period performance, second-period incentives are high-powered, pro-
viding a low expected utility to the agent. This procedure is well in line with
corporate practice, where low performers frequently are given a second chance,
but with more demanding targets to be met. To prevent renegotiation of such a
contract, it is important to involve the third party as a signee into the bonus-pool
arrangement.
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Appendix - Proof of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1:
From the Lagrangian of the problem (1) – (5), the first order condition
∂L
∂sit
= λtp
H
it + µt
[
pHit − pLit
]− νit + ηit = 0
can be derived, where λt, µt, {νit}i=1,...,n and {ηit}i=1,...,n are the multipliers of
the constraints (2), (3), (4) and (5). If the agent earns a rent, the participation
constraint (2) is not binding and therefore λt = 0. Furthermore, µt > 0 must
hold because otherwise the incentive constraint would not bind. Then, however,
the principal could save payments by decreasing all payments larger than smin by
some small amount, thus reducing the bonus pool size st. Therefore, since both
νit and ηit are nonnegative by definition, it must hold that νit > 0 if the term
in brackets is positive and ηit > 0 if the term in brackets is negative. Hence, if
pHit > p
L
it, the budget constraint (4) will be binding, whereas for p
H
it < p
L
it the
liability constraint (5) will be binding. From these facts the binary structure of the
contract follows.
Under the binary structure, the incentive constraint (3) can be re-stated as
smin + PHt+
[
st − smin
]− cHt ≥ smin + PLt+ [st − smin]
or [
PHt+ − PLt+
] [
st − smin
] ≥ cHt
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from which the cost-minimizing size of the bonus pool,
st = s
min +
cHt
PHt+ − PLt+
,
follows. 2
To prove Proposition 2, it is helpful to first consider the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If the likelihood ratio pLi /pHi of probability functions pki is strictly de-
creasing in i, this likelihood ratio for i > 1 is strictly smaller than the likeli-
hood ratio FLi /F
H
i of the corresponding cumulative distribution functions F
k
i =∑i
j=1 p
k
j , i.e,
pLi /p
H
i < F
L
i /F
H
i ∀ i > 1.
Proof Since pk1 = F k1 , it suffices to show that from pLi−1/pHi−1 ≤ FLi−1/FHi−1
and strict MLRP it follows that pLi /p
H
i < F
L
i /F
H
i . Strict MLRP and p
L
i−1/p
H
i−1 ≥
FLi−1/F
H
i−1 imply that
pLi
pHi
<
FLi−1
FHi−1
or
FHi−1
pHi
<
FLi−1
pLi
.
Adding 1 on both sides yields
pHi + F
H
i−1
pHi
<
pLi + F
L
i−1
pLi
which due to the fact that pki + F
k
i−1 = P
k
i gives
FHi
pHi
<
FLi
pLi
⇔ p
L
i
pHi
<
FLi
FHi
.
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2Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof of Proposition 2 is by construction. Suppose short-term contracts
are used in both periods. We show that the principal can do better. To that purpose,
he may change the second-period contract for those realizations of Y1 where pHi1 ≥
pLi1, i.e. where a bonus is due in the short-term contract. Instead of paying
sij2 =

smin if j ∈ I−2
smin +
cH2
PH2+−PL2+
if j ∈ I+2
if i ∈ I+1 , where P k2+ =
∑
I+2
pki2, as in the optimal short-term contract, the princi-
pal offers sij2 +∆s where the contract variation
∆s =

δ
pLj2−pHj2
if j = jˆ = max I−2
δ
PH2+−PL2+
ifj ∈ I+2
0 else
is constructed such that the incentive compatibility constraint (11) still holds with
equality, and δ > 0 is some small amount.
The principal extends bonus payments to the highest realization jˆ = max I−2
of Y2 which is more likely under aL. This extension decreases incentives, and the
bonus for I+2 has to be increased. The principal’s second period compensation
cost therefore increases by ∆2 = δ/(PH2+ − PL2+). At the same time, however, the
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agents expected second-period utility increases by
∆1 = p
H
jˆ2
δ
pL
jˆ2
− pH
jˆ2
+ PH2+
δ
PL2+ − PH2+
.
The agent will anticipate this increase. Thus, to keep first-period incentives, his
first-period compensation for i ∈ I+1 may be decreased by ∆1. Since a positive
bonus is paid for i ∈ I+1 in the short-term contract, such a decrease is possible for
small δ and decreases the principal’s first period compensation cost by ∆1.
In total, the principal’s compensation cost is lower under the variation if the
saving ∆1 in the first period exceeds the cost ∆2 in the second. This is the case if
pH
jˆ2
pL
jˆ2
− pH
jˆ2
+
PH2+
PH2+ − PL2+
>
1
PH2+ − PL2+
or
pH
jˆ2
pL
jˆ2
− pH
jˆ2
>
1− PH2+
PH2+ − PL2+
.
Taking into account that 1 − P k2+ = F kjˆ2 and PH2+ − PL2+ = FLjˆ2 − FHjˆ2 , where
F kit =
∑i
j=1 p
k
it is the cumulative distribution function, denoting the probability
that Yt does not exceed yi under action k, this can be written as
pH
jˆ2
pL
jˆ2
− pH
jˆ2
>
FH
jˆ2
FL
jˆ2
− FH
jˆ2
⇔
pL
jˆ2
− pH
jˆ2
pH
jˆ2
<
FL
jˆ2
− FH
jˆ2
FH
jˆ2
⇔
pL
jˆ2
pH
jˆ2
<
FL
jˆ2
FH
jˆ2
which is always fulfilled under MLRP (see Lemma 1). 2
Proof of Proposition 3:
To analyze the principal’s optimization problem (7) - (13), let λ1 and {λi2}i=1,...,n
denote the multipliers of the individual rationality constraints (8) and (9), µ1 and
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{µi2}i=1,...,n be those of the incentive compatibility constraints (10) and (11),
{νij}i=1,...,n,j=1,...,n be the multipliers of the budget constraints (12), and {ηi}i=1,...,n
and {ηij}i=1,...,n,j=1,...,n be those of the first-period and second-period liability con-
straints (13).
To prove claim 1, consider the first-order condition with respect to the first-
period compensation si1,
∂L
∂si1
= λ1p
H
i1 + µ1
[
pHi1 − pLi1
]− n∑
j=1
νij + ηi = 0.
Since the agent is assumed to earn a rent, it holds that λ1 = 0. The incentive
constraint (10) will be binding, therefore µ1 > 0. Thus, if pHi1 > p
L
i1 it holds that
ηi > 0, i.e. the liability constraint is binding and si1 = smin.
To prove claim 2, consider the first-order condition with respect to the second-
period compensation sij2,
∂L
∂si1
= λ1p
H
i1p
H
j2 + λi2p
H
j2 + µ1p
H
i1
[
pHj2 − pLj2
]− νij + ηij = 0. (22)
Again, λ1 = 0 holds by our assumption that the agent earns a rent. Moreover,
the liability constraint sij2 ≥ smin will not be strictly binding for the considered
case that si1 > smin because if the principal would like to decrease sij2, he could
likewise decrease si1, which has the same effect. Therefore, ηij = 0 and (22) can
be written as
λi2p
H
j2 + µ1p
H
i1
[
pHj2 − pLj2
]− νij = 0. (23)
Now assume that the budget constraint (12) is not binding and νij = 0. Condition
33
(23) becomes
−λi2 = µ1pHi1
[
1− p
L
j2
pHj2
]
,
which can only be fulfilled for one single realizations of Y2 because of the strict
monotone likelihood ratio property. Since −λi2 < µ1pHi1
[
1− pLj2/pHj2
]
will hold
for all other realizations by νij > 0, this single outcome has to be the one with the
highest likelihood ratio, j = 1. Thus, the bonus pool constraint will be binding for
all but the worst performance. Given this binary incentive scheme, the necessary
wage spread can be derived from the second-period incentive constraint which
becomes
si12 + (1− pH12) [si2 − si12]− cHt ≥ si12 + (1− pL12) [si2 − si12] si2
or [
pL12 − pH12
]
[si2 − si12] ≥ cHt
from which the cost-minimizing bonus
si2 − si12 = c
H
t
pL12 − pH12
follows. 2
Proof of Corollary 1:
No third-party payments are due if the agent receives the stipulated bonus in
both periods. In the first period, bonuses are due with probability PH1+ in both
contracts. In the second period, the bonus probability is PH2+ in the short-term
contract, whereas this probability is reduced in the long-term contract (see the
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proof of Proposition 2).
Proof of Proposition 4:
The binary structure of the contract can be derived by the same line of arguments
as in the proof to Proposition 1, just substituting compensation terms s by mone-
tary utilities v(s). Given the binary structure, the incentive constraint becomes
PHt−v(s
min) + PHt+v(st)− cHt ≥ PLt−v(smin) + PLt+v(st)
or [
PHt+ − PLt+
] [
v(st)− v(smin)
] ≥ cHt
from which the cost-minimizing bonus pool of size
st = v
−1
(
v(smin) +
cHt
PHt+ − PLt+
)
can be derived. 2
To prove Proposition 5, it is helpful to first consider the following lemmas:
Lemma 2 If the likelihood ratio pLi /pHi of probability functions pki is strictly de-
creasing in i, this likelihood ratio for i < n is strictly larger than the likelihood
ratio PLi /P
H
i of the corresponding survival functions P
k
i =
∑n
j=i p
k
j , i.e.,
pLi /p
H
i > P
L
i /P
H
i ∀ i < n.
Proof Since pkn = P kn , it suffices to show that from pLi+1/pHi+1 ≥ PLi+1/PHi+1
and strict MLRP it follows that pLi /p
H
i > P
L
i /P
H
i . Strict MLRP and p
L
i+1/p
H
i+1 ≥
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PLi+1/P
H
i+1 imply that
pLi
pHi
>
PLi+1
PHi+1
or
PHi+1
pHi
>
PLi+1
pLi
.
Adding 1 on both sides yields
pHi + P
H
i+1
pHi
>
pLi + P
L
i+1
pLi
which due to the fact that pki + P
k
i+1 = P
k
i gives
PHi
pHi
>
PLi
pLi
⇔ p
L
i
pHi
>
PLi
PHi
.
2
Lemma 3 If the likelihood ratio pLi /pHi of probability functions pki is strictly de-
creasing in i, the same holds for the likelihood ratio PLi /P
H
i of survival functions
P ki =
∑i
j=1 p
k
j .
Proof From Lemma 2 we know that
pLi
pHi
>
PLi
PHi
∀ i < n
or
pLi
pHi
≥ P
L
i
PHi
∀ i.
By MLRP it follows that
pLi
pHi
>
PLi+1
PHi+1
⇔ p
L
i
PLi+1
>
pHi
PHi+1
∀ i < n.
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Adding 1 on both sides gives
pLi + P
L
i+1
PLi+1
>
pHi + P
H
i+1
PHi+1
∀ i < n.
Using the fact that pki + P
k
i+1 = P
k
i we get
PLi
PLi+1
>
PHi
PHi+1
⇔ P
L
i
PiH
>
PLi+1
PHi+1
∀ i < n.
2
Proof of Proposition 5:
The proof is by construction. Suppose that the optimal short-term contract,
(21), is used in both periods. We show that the principal can do better.
To that purpose, consider the following variation of the second-period contract
∆s =

∆1 for j = jˆ = min I+2
∆2 for j ∈ I+2 \jˆ.
(24)
for the case that the agent’s performance in the first-period was bad news: His
compensation for the lowest level jˆ = min I+2 of performance obeying good news
is decreased by ∆1, while the compensation for all other good news performance
levels j > jˆ are increased by ∆2, where ∆1 and ∆2 are chosen to fulfil
v(sjˆ2) = v(s2)− δ (25)
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and
v(sj2) = v(s2) + δ
pH
jˆ2
− pL
jˆ2
PH
jˆ+1,2
− PL
jˆ+1,2
, (26)
where P k
jˆ+1,2
=
∑n
j=jˆ+1 p
k
j2 is the probability that the agent’s second-period per-
formance is at least yjˆ+1. Since we consider the case in which no bonus was paid
in the first period, such a variation always exists for levels of δ small enough.
Equations (25) and (26) guarantee that the agent’s second-period incentive
constraint is still met. The agent’s second-period expected utility, however, differs
by
−δpH
jˆ2
+ δ
pH
jˆ2
− pL
jˆ2
PH
jˆ+1,2
− PL
jˆ+1,2
PH
jˆ+1,2
.
This amount is negative if
pH
jˆ2
pH
jˆ2
− pL
jˆ2
>
PH
jˆ+1,2
PH
jˆ+1,2
− PL
jˆ+1,2
⇔
pH
jˆ2
− pL
jˆ2
pH
jˆ2
<
PH
jˆ+1,2
− PL
jˆ+1,2
PH
jˆ+1,2
⇔
pL
jˆ2
pH
jˆ2
>
PL
jˆ+1,2
PH
jˆ+1,2
which is always the case under MLRP (see Lemma 3).
All other things equal, the agent therefore incurs a utility loss if he fails in
the first period, compared to the situation with two short-term contracts. Thus,
the principal may decrease the first-period bonus s1 without violating the first-
period incentive constraint. By this means, the total bonus pool size and thus the
principal’s compensation cost is decreased. 2
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